No ‘end of the peace process’: Federalism and ethnic violence in Nepal

How does the reform of territorial state structures shape prospects for peace after war? Existing research on the institutional causes of peace often focuses on how institutional designs, as the outcomes of reform processes, reduce post-war violence and promote peace. The literature does less frequently address how the politics that characterise reform processes affect the legitimacy of institutions and whether or not violent protest ultimately takes place: this risks omitting key explanations of how institutional reforms contribute to peace and the mechanisms by which this occurs. By examining the case of Nepal, where clashes between protesters and security forces over constitutional provisions for federalism have killed more than 60 people since August 2015, this study shows that three factors of the territorial reform process contributed to the onset of post-war ethnic violence. These included: (1) elite control of decision-making; (2) tight deadlines that promoted backtracking on previous commitments; and (3) the embedding of single territorial reforms in a ‘concert’ of institutional reforms that, as a whole, sparked fear of discrimination among ethnic minorities