Individual accountability in Irish credit institutions—Lessons to be learned from the United Kingdom’s Senior Managers’ Regime

This article examines the Senior Managers' Regime (SMR), the duty of responsibility and the offence relating to a decision causing a financial institution to fail introduced by the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 to give legislative effect to the recommendations of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. The Commission had examined impediments to accountability in the wake of the LIBOR scandal. The article explores the value of introducing similar requirements and regulations in Ireland as a means of improving individual accountability and allaying public concern in light of the Irish Banking Crisis and the more recent tracker mortgage scandal. It concludes that in cases of mismanagement which is not deliberate or reckless, the Central Bank of Ireland's model of proactive and intensive supervision and enforcement might benefit from the utilization of a SMR enhanced administrative sanctions procedure alongside its Fitness and Probity Regime. However, the introduction of an offence in Ireland relating to a decision causing a financial institution to fail, while appearing to respond to a public desire to improve accountability, would give rise to a number of significant challenges particularly in relation to enforcement