Building impartial electoral management? Institutional design, independence and electoral integrity

Electoral integrity is a persistent concern in both established and transitional democracies. Independent Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) have been championed as a key institutional reform measure to strengthen electoral integrity and are now the most common model of electoral management worldwide. Yet, empirical research has found conflicting evidence on the link between formal EMB independence and electoral integrity. We argue that conflicting findings might be driven by the lack of detailed data on EMB institutional design, with most studies using rudimentary classifications of ‘independent’, ‘governmental’ and ‘mixed’ EMBs, without addressing specific dimensions of EMB formal independence such as appointment procedures, budgetary control and formal competences. In this paper we analyse new detailed data on EMB institutional design in 72 countries around the world, develop a more detailed typology of dimensions of de jure EMB independence, and demonstrate how de jure EMB independence affects de facto EMB independence and electoral integrity