全部 标题 作者
关键词 摘要

OALib Journal期刊
ISSN: 2333-9721
费用:99美元

查看量下载量

相关文章

更多...

Ideal Reactive Equilibrium

DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/g10020019

Keywords: refinements of Nash equilibrium, dynamic games, imperfect information, beliefs

Full-Text   Cite this paper   Add to My Lib

Abstract:

Abstract Refinements of the Nash equilibrium have followed the strategy of extending the idea of subgame perfection to incomplete information games. This has been achieved by appropriately restricting beliefs at unreached information sets. Each new refinement gives stricter and more mathematically-complicated limitations on permitted beliefs. A simpler approach is taken here, where the whole idea of beliefs is dispensed with, and a new equilibrium concept, called the ideal reactive equilibrium, that builds on some pioneering work by Amershi, Sadanand and Sadanand on thought process dynamics, is developed. View Full-Tex

Full-Text

Contact Us

service@oalib.com

QQ:3279437679

WhatsApp +8615387084133