基于CVC创业链声誉的微分对策研究
Research on Differential Countermeasures Based on CVC Entrepreneurship Reputation

DOI: 10.12677/FIN.2019.93037, PP. 290-300

Keywords: 公司创业投资，投资收益，HJB方程
Company Venture Capital, Investment Income, HJB Equation

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Abstract:

公司创业投资作为创业投资的重要一员，近些年得到了迅速地发展。如何使公司创业投资能够有效发挥其作用，就成为了重要的研究课题。本文通过公司创业投资创业链声誉的视角出发，利用随机微分的方法研究公司创业投资和创业企业之间的合作问题，得到了公司创业投资和创业企业在Nash博弈以及创业企业为主导下的Stackelberg博弈下的最优策略，并对两种博弈下的最优收益进行比较分析。研究结果显示：Nash博弈条件下，CVC的最优收益较高于在Stackelberg博弈条件下获得的最优收益，而创业企业的最优收益与在Stackelberg博弈条件下获得的最优收益相比则相对较低。
As an important member of venture capital investment, company venture capital has been rapidly developed in recent years. It has become an important research topic that how to make the com-pany venture capital can effectively play its role. From the perspective of the reputation of the company venture capital and entrepreneurship chain, this paper uses the method of stochastic differentiation to study the cooperation between the company venture capital and the startups, and obtains the optimal strategy under the Nash game and Stackelberg game that startups dominant. Then the optimal returns under the two games are compared and analyzed. The result shows that under the Nash game condition, the optimal return of CVC is higher than that obtained under Stackelberg game condition, and the optimal return of start-up enterprise is lower compared with the optimal return obtained under Stackelberg game condition.

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