具身模拟假设——意义研究新进展
Embodied Simulation Hypothesis—Advances in the Study of Meaning

DOI: 10.12677/ML.2018.73033, PP. 245-251

Keywords: 意义，具身，模拟，新进展
Meaning, Embodiment, Simulation, Advances

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Abstract:

意义是语言研究的终极话题。Lakoff & Johnson (1980)利用详实的语料论证了体验在意义生成中的重要作用，他们随后(1999)系统阐释了认知科学的三大重要发现：心智的具身性，思维的无意识性，和抽象概念的隐喻性；Langacker (1987)提出意义即概念化。自此，意义的研究从传统意义观进入认知意义观，意义不再是客观地给定的，而是主体依据自身经验建构起来的，是认知加工的产物。Damasio (1996)更是直指笛卡尔，通过一系列实验和强有力的论证向世人证实：没有身体，就没有心智(No body, never mind) ；同年，Rizzolatti等人(1996)通过实验首次发现镜像神经元的存在[5]，为认知具身假设提供了神经生物学证据，由此引发了具身革命。具身模拟假设(embodied simulation hypothesis)突破了哲学假设的藩篱，促进了意义的科学研究，强有力地证实了语言的理解(意义的产生)需要我们在心智中模拟对相关事物的体验(Bergen, 2012) 。Lakoff (2014: 12)再次特别强调，具身化是意义产生的核心机制，并且指出，不管是具体概念，还是抽象概念，其意义都离不开具身化。
Meaning is the ultimate concern of linguistic research. Based on inspiring analyses of metaphoric expressions, Lakoff & Johnson (1980) point out the prominence of experience in the meaning making; later they (1999) expound the three important discoveries of cognitive science: the mind is inherently embodied, thought is mostly unconscious, and abstract concepts are largely metaphorical. Almost at the same time, Langacker (1987) comes up with the idea that meaning is conceptualization. Since then, the study of meaning has entered the cognitive era: meaning is not objectively given, but constructed by individuals based on their bodily experiences. Damasio (1996), having done a series of neuro-scientific experiments, claims that: no body, never mind; in the same year, Rizzolatti and colleagues discover mirror neurons, which provides neurobiological evidence for embodied simulation hypothesis and provokes the Embodiment Revolution. Embodied simulation hypothesis, synthesizing substantial experiments, proves that we understand language by simulating in our minds what it would be like to experience the things that the language describes (Bergen, 2012). Lakoff (2014: 12) emphasizes the centrality of embodiment as the mechanism of meaningfulness.

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