协同效应视角下VC与创业企业的最优收益模型研究
Research on the Optimal Income Model of VC and Entrepreneurial Enterprises from the Perspective of Synergy Effect

DOI: 10.12677/FIN.2019.96073, PP. 657-672

Keywords: 协同效应，创业投资，HJB方程
Synergy Effect, Venture Capital, HJB Equation

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Abstract:

运用C-D生产函数，基于VC与创业企业间的协同效应构建了连续时间下VC和创业企业协同合作、不合作、VC主导的Stackelberg主从博弈、创业企业主导的Stackelberg主从博弈微分收益模型，利用HJB方程求出了四种博弈模型下的最优收益策略，比较了VC不同的持股比例对最优收益、协同效应激励的影响，运用Matlab7.0作出各参数与最优收益策略的关系图并进行了参数的敏感性分析。结果表明，VC持股比例小于50%时，创业企业更倾向于提供协同效应激励，且此时会带来更高的创业链总收益；而VC持股比例大于50%时，VC更倾向于提供协同效应激励并带来更高的创业链总收益。
Based on C-D production function and synergy effect between VC and entrepreneur, this article mainly discusses four differential game models in the continuous time, which is namely cooperative game model, non-cooperative one, VC-dominating Stackelberg model, entrepreneur-dominating Stackelberg model. HJB equation is used to find the optimal return strategy. It analyses the effect on different VC shareholding ratios to the optimal return and synergy incentives. Matlab 7.0 is used to draft the relationship between relative parameters and optimal return strategy. Sensitivity analysis of model parameters is performed. The results show that entrepreneurs are more inclined to provide synergy incentives and bring higher total return when VC shareholding ratio is less than 50%; while it is greater than 50%, VC is more inclined to provide synergy incentives and bring higher total return.

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