财务困境、超额薪酬与薪酬业绩敏感性——基于政府补贴的调节效应
Financial Dilemma,Excess Compensation and Compensation-performance Sensitivity ——Based on Moderating Effects of Government Subsidy

以我国上市公司2006-2012年的财务困境和非财务困境公司的数据为样本，通过考察财务困境与超额薪酬及薪酬业绩敏感性之间的关系，验证政府补贴对财务困境与超额薪酬及薪酬业绩敏感性间的调节效应。结果发现，政府补贴正向调节了财务困境与超额薪酬及薪酬业绩敏感性之间的关系，政府补贴是管理者攫取超额薪酬的途径之一，并改变了财务困境上市公司薪酬与业绩之间的敏感性。研究显示，政府补贴会改变财务困境对超额薪酬的抑制作用机制，降低薪酬契约的激励效应，这为我国进一步完善薪酬契约和合理配置政府补贴提供了新的经验证据。
Based on the samples from Chinese listed companies with either financial or non-financial dilemma during 2006-2012,this paper verifies the moderation effects of government subsidy by exploring the relationship among financial dilemma,excess compensation and compensation performance sensitivity.The result shows that government subsidy has positive effect on the relationship among these variables and government subsidy is an important way to get excess compensation for managers,which changes the compensation performance sensitivity for those listed companies with financial dilemma.The study shows that government subsidy will change the inhibition mechanism of financial dilemma on excess compensation,and reduce the incentive effect of the compensation contracts,which will provide new theoretical evidences for further improving compensation contracts and the rational distribution of the government subsidy.