博弈视角下中国电影保底发行的性质及策略选择
The nature and strategy choice of Chinese flm minimumguarantee issue from the perspective of Game theory

摘要 中国电影产业保底发行是非零和博弈。在博弈过程中，双方即制作方与发行方在利 益上既存在冲突，也会“双赢”，因此在策略选择时，双方既有竞争策略，也有合作策 略。在采取合作策略时，博弈双方会通过排片合同、票房造假等“共谋”手段，谋取 共同利益，而这些行为对中国电影产业会产生不良影响。要改变这种状况，应在票房评 估、宣发、上映环节采取相关优化措施。
Minimum-guarantee issue of Chinese Movie Industry is a non-zero-sum game. In the process of game, the game players-producers and issuers have conflicts, but also common interests. Therefore, when the players choose the strategies,they can adopt competitive strategies and cooperative collusion.When they choose cooperative strategies,they may obtain economic benefts by screening contract and box offce fraud, which will have a negative impact on the Chinese flm industry.In order to change this situation, it is necessary to prohibit the screening contract, implement the sub issue, improve the box offce evaluation mechanism, investigate box offce fraud, and establish a standardized information disclosure mechanism