再谈环境保护税设置——基于两类竞争制造企业环保技术创新策略的演化博弈
A Discussion on Environmental Tax Setting——Based on the Evolutionary Game Model Analysis

利用演化博弈模型分析处在竞争的两类制造企业（在位企业和进入企业）的环保技术创新策略问题，考量以环境保护税为主体的环保规制如何科学设置才能更好地促进制造业企业的环保创新。研究发现：创新效应和市场需求均影响企业创新策略演化的均衡结果，并在两阶段博弈分析的基础上，得出市场需求和创新效应共同作用下两类制造企业的生产策略选择方案。因此，环境保护税的改革与实施应注意掌握好时点，税率的设置应充分考虑不同行业环保创新效应和产品市场需求，进行区别化的、动态的税率设置，并加大其他税种对环境保护税的支持。
This paper analyzes the problem of environmental technology innovation strategy using the evolutionary game model. The research finds that the innovation effect and the market demand both influence the equilibrium outcome of the evolution of corporate innovation. On the basis of the two stage game analysis, the production strategy choice of the manufacturing enterprises under the combined effect of the above two considerations is concluded. Thus the key to the reform and implementation of environmental protection tax is the timing. The proposed tax rate should be differentiated or dynamic tax rate. And the support of other taxes to the environmental protection tax is also necessary.