基于期权博弈的PPP项目特许权期决策模型
Concession Period Decision Models for Public Private Partnership Based on Option Games

运用期权博弈方法，从无政府担保基本情形出发，构建PPP项目特许权期决策模型，考量政府参与风险分担对特许权期的影响。结果表明，收益波动率一定的情况下，特许权期随着政府最低收益担保期望价值的增加而减少；而在政府最低收益担保期望价值一定的情况下，特许权期随着收益波动率的增加而增加。鉴此，政府应根据项目的风险收益情况实施弹性特许权期制。
This paper, taking the government investment and sharing risks into consideration, manages to seek out concession period decision models for Public Private Partnership with option game theory, studies the influence of government investment on concession period and demonstrates the above-mentioned models in the Guangshen highway. The result shows that when earnings volatility was stable, concession period reduced with the increase of the lowest income expectation value, while under certain lowest income expectation value of government, concession period increased with the increase of earnings volatility. Still, the paper puts forward the argument that the government shall implement flexible concession period in accordance with the specific circumstances of Public Private Partnership.