境外股东异质性、企业性质与公司治理效率——基于中国上市公司的实证检验
Heterogeneity of Foreign Shareholders, Nature of Enterprises and Efficiency of Corporate Governance--Empirical Evidence Based on the Empirical Study of the Chinese Listed Companies

依据2014年一直有境外股东持股的沪深A股上市公司样本数据，考量不同类型外资持股的治理效应进行实证检验。结果表明：境外股东持股能够提升公司治理效率，不同性质的境外投资者对公司治理的影响存在差异。外资基金和非金融类外资股东的治理效应是显著的，QFII未能对上市公司经营者形成有效监督和制约，外资银行、保险、证券公司反而一定程度上加重了上市公司的代理冲突。此外，外资持股在民营企业中的治理效应优于国有企业。
Based on the data of listed companies with foreign shareholders throughout 2014 in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock markets, this study empirically examines the corporate governance effect by different types of foreign shareholders. We find that the foreign shareholders on the whole can effectively promote corporate governance efficiency, and different types of foreign shareholders have different effects on corporate governance. Foreign funds and the non-financial institutes have significantly positive effects on corporate governance. QFII can not supervise and restrict the management of the listed companies effectively, while shareholders of foreign banks, insurance companies and securities companies even aggravate the agency conflicts of the listed companies. In addition, the governance effect of foreign shareholders in private enterprises is better than that of state owned enterprises.