董事高管责任保险与企业财务困境风险——基于A股上市公司的经验证据
Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance and Financial Distress Risk——An Empirical Study Based on A-share Listed Companies

以2006-2015年A股上市公司为样本，检验董事高管责任保险对企业财务困境风险的影响及其作用机制。研究发现：购买董事高管责任保险有助于降低企业的财务困境风险，保险公司的监督作用是企业财务困境风险降低的主要原因；高质量的内部控制或较多的分析师跟踪能减弱董事高管责任保险对企业财务困境风险的治理效用；产权性质则未产生显著的影响。
This paper explores the relationship between directors' and officers' liability insurance and financial distress risk by the dataset of China's A-share companies from 2006 to 2015. The empirical study shows that directors' and officers' liability insurance can obviously decrease the financial distress risk of corporations. An analysis of the mechanism reveals that insurance company's monitoring is the main reason why directors' and officer' liability insurance can cut down the financial distress risk. Further research shows that high quality internal control and frequent analysts tracking have significant substitution effect for directors' and officers' liability insurance effect on the financial distress risk; while property right does not have a significant effect on curbing the financial distress risk.