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- 2015
演化博弈下的小微企业集合融资模式
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Abstract:
基于所构建的商业银行与小微企业之间的集合融资演化博弈模型，以企业群体内部形成的自助担保机制为研究背景，分别对集合融资过程中有抵押资产和无抵押资产两种情形下的双方策略变化趋势进行了探讨。通过演化博弈分析认为，无抵押资产的集合融资贷款模式并没有增加银行的信用风险，且该模式不仅可以帮助银行降低贷款审查成本，拓宽中间业务渠道，还可以缓解小微企业信息不透明问题，防范企业违约风险的产生，同时降低企业获得资金的门槛，为解决小微企业的融资问题提供了新的思路。
This paper establishes the evolutionary game model of collective financing between commercial banks and small-and-micro-sized enterprises. The investigations were conducted on the two parties′ strategies trend in the different cases which are secured loans and unsecured loans in the context of self-guarantee mechanism formed in enterprises group. Through the game analysis, we conclude that the unsecured collective financing mode does not increase the credit risk of bank. The given mode can both reduce the cost of examination and expand the channels of middle business of commercial bank. For small-and-micro-sized enterprises, it will not only mitigate the problem of information opacity, but also prevent the enterprises default risk. Furthermore, this approach lowers the financing threshold and gives a new way of thinking to solve the financing problems of small-and-micro-sized enterprises
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