机构持股、投资决策与高管薪酬 ――基于经理人职业声誉模型的理论分析
Institutional Ownership, Investment Decisions and Executive Compensation ――Analysis of a career concerns model of managers

机构投资者持股对公司治理的积极作用已经得到广泛认可，然而传统观点认为增加机构持股比例会抑制公司投资、降低高管薪酬，这与近期实证研究发现的证据存在矛盾。为此构建了基于经理人职业声誉顾虑的理论模型，试图为相关实证结果提供合理的解释。研究表明，机构持股比例越高，越能增强机构投资者监督、了解经理人经营能力的意愿，从而确保高能力经理人不会因偶然投资失败而面临声誉风险，这就增大了高能力经理人为公司投资创利的可能性，同时也使经理人能够获得与自身经营能力相适应的薪酬回报。
Institutional investors holding an active role in corporate governance has been widely recognized, but the traditional view that increases in the proportion of institutional ownership will inhibit investment and reduce executive compensation, which contradicts the evidence of recent empirical researches. In this paper, a theoretical model was constructed based on the manager′s career concerns, trying to provide a reasonable explanation for the relevant empirical results. Studies have shown that the higher the proportion of institutional ownership, the more investors′ willing to supervise the managers, ensuring high capability managers will not fail due to accidental reputational risk. Therefore, managers will have a greater possibility to make profitable investment, while be able to get rewards according to their capability