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-  2015 

破解渠道投机的恶性循环:合同治理与关系治理权变模型
How to Break the Vicious Circle of Channel Opportunism: ?DA contingency framework of contract and relational governance

Keywords: 渠道投机,投机行为相互性,合同治理,关系规范
channel opportunism
,opportunist behavior reciprocity,contract governance,relational norms

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Abstract:

基于交易成本理论、关系契约理论与相互性理论,实证探讨了合同与关系规范对渠道投机行为及其相互性的影响。从制造商角度收集数据,采用层次回归分析发现:经销商的投机行为会加重制造商的投机行为(相互性);经销商可以通过单独使用合同或关系规范减弱制造商的投机行为,也可以共同使用它们以达到更好的效果;不过在抑制渠道投机相互性方面,只有共同使用合同与关系规范才能将其有效减弱,减弱的效果随不同的组合水平而定。
Based on the theories of transaction cost,relational contract and reciprocity,we empirically examine the impacts of contract and relational norms on channel opportunism as well as its reciprocity. We collect the data from the angle of manufactures and adopt the hierarchical regression analysis,finding that suppliers′ opportunist behavior aggravates manufactures′ opportunist behavior (reciprocity);suppliers can not only employ either contract or relational norms to mitigate manufactures′ opportunist behavior,but also simultaneously apply these two governance mechanisms to achieve better effects. However,reciprocity of channel opportunism can only be effectively weakened when contract and relational norms are both employed and the weakening effectiveness is dependent on different combinations of these two governance mechanisms

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