不确定性条件下风险投资高收益的触发条件 ――以估值调整协议为视角
Trigger Conditions of Higher Earnings of Venture Capitalists under Uncertainty Condition-From the Perspective of Valuation Adjustment Agreement

当使用估值调整协议时，风险投资机构和创业企业的收益将直接受企业的盈利水平影响，而企业的盈利水平与其风险之间又存在必然的联系。为此，以估值调整协议的应用为视角，将风险投资机构最优退出时机引入风险投资参与主体收益函数，从理论上揭示并证明了不确定条件下风险投资高收益的触发条件，并得到如下结论：当风险投资机构所投项目价值的不确定性较大时，风险投资机构只能在双赢时获得高收益；而不确定性较小时，不论企业的盈利是否达到估值调整规定的标准，风险投资机构都可能得到较高收益；风险投资机构要获得高收益，所投项目价值需大于其阈值，并且不确定性越大，对创业企业的盈利水平要求越高，直至到达估值调整协议规定的双赢标准。
When using valuation adjustment agreement,earnings of venture capitalists and entrepreneurial companies will be directly affected by the enterprise′s profit level,while there is a connection between the profitability and risk of the enterprise. So the paper embarks from the yield function of venture capitalists,which include venture capitalists′ optimal exit opportunity,based on the application background of the valuation adjustment agreement,to reveal and prove theoretically the trigger condition of higher yield of venture capitalists under the condition of uncertainty. It turns out that when the uncertainty of investment project value is bigger,the venture capitalists can get higher yields when win-win；when the uncertainty of investment project value is smaller,venture capitalists are likely to get higher yield,regardless of whether the enterprise′s profit to achieve the standards set by the valuation adjustment. While if the venture capitalists get higher yield,entrepreneurial companies value should be bigger than limit value,and when the greater the uncertainty is,the higher profitability requirements for entrepreneurial companies are,until it reaches the valuation adjustment win-win standards set forth in the agreement