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- 2015
IPO超募对我国上市公司非效率投资的影响 ――来自创业板的经验证据
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Abstract:
基于投资现金流敏感性分析框架，利用中国创业板上市公司2009-2013年的数据进行实证研究后发现:中国创业板市场既存在过度投资行为也存在投资不足困境，但过度投资比投资不足更为严重；IPO超募进一步加剧了创业板上市公司的过度投资行为;信息不对称下的代理冲突是导致创业板上市公司过度投资的主要原因，内部监控、激励机制和外部监督对于改善代理冲突、抑制过度投资可起到一定作用。
Based on the analysis framework of investment-cash flow sensitivity, employing data of ChiNext listed companies from 2009 to 2013, this paper empirically finds that there exist both over-investment and under-investment problems on ChiNext market, of which the over-investment problem is more serious. Additionally, IPO over-financing makes the over-investment problem even worse. As agency conflict under asymmetric information is a major reason that leads to over-investment of ChiNext listed companies, internal control, incentive mechanism and external supervision might be helpful to ease agency conflicts and mitigate over-investment
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