全部 标题 作者
关键词 摘要

OALib Journal期刊
ISSN: 2333-9721
费用:99美元

查看量下载量

相关文章

更多...
-  2017 

关系型、交易型互联网贷款的信贷风险对比研究
Comparative Study on Credit Risk between Relationship and Transaction Internet Lending

DOI: 10.15896/j.xjtuskxb.201706003

Keywords: 互联网贷款,交易型互联网贷款,关系型互联网贷款,信贷风险,银行监管
internet lending
,transaction internet lending,relationship internet lending,credit risk,banking supervision

Full-Text   Cite this paper   Add to My Lib

Abstract:

基于波尔顿等的互联网贷款理论模型,以阿里小贷、Kabbage公司、P2P贷款公司为研究对象,检验了关系型与交易型互联网贷款的信贷风险差异。理论和案例研究表明:属于关系型互联网贷款的阿里小贷和Kabbage公司,形成了基于电子商务的互联网贷款模式,其优势在于动态、连续、充分地掌握了电商的经济行为和资信状况,能迅速准确评估电商的信用风险;而属于交易型互联网贷款的P2P贷款公司,其实质是传统信贷业务的简单互联网化,不仅无助于化解信息不对称引发的信贷风险,而且叠加了网络非面对面识别的风险。因此,应参照银行业监管规则,针对关系型互联网贷款和交易型互联网贷款的风险特征,制定切实可行的监管细则,实现互联网贷款在风险可控范围内的可持续发展。
This paper, based on theoretical model of internet lending from Bolton′s, makes a case study on Ali small loans, Kabbage Company, P2P lending companies, and examines credit risk differences between relationship and transaction internet lending. Theory and case study show that Ali small loans and Kabbage Company which belongs to relational Internet lending have formed internet lending pattern based on electronic commerce, and both have an advantage to dynamically, continuously, sufficiently master economic behavior and credit status of electronic commerce, and can quickly, accurately assess credit risk of electronic commerce. However, P2P lending companies which belongs to transactional internet lending essentially is that only simply changed traditional credit business into internet, which not only fail to solve credit risk caused by information asymmetry, but also superimpose risk caused by no face to face recognition. Therefore, we should, based on banking regulatory rules, focusing on the risk characteristics of relationship and transaction internet lending, make feasible regulation rules, in order to make internet lending sustainable develop within the acceptable bound of the risk

References

[1]  [5]BOLTON P, FREIXAS X. Corporate Finance and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism [J]. Review of Financial Studies, 2006, 19: 829870.
[2]  [6]SHARPE S A. Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships [J]. Journal of Finance, 1990, 45: 10691087.
[3]  [12]HAUSWALD R, MARQUEZ R. Relationship Banking, Loan Specialization and Competition [R]. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 2000: 108131.
[4]  [13]DIAMOND D W, RAGHURAM G R. A theory of Bank Capital [J]. Journal of Finance, 2000, 55: 24312465.
[5]  [14]DIAMOND D W, RAGHURAM G R. Liquidity Shortage and Banking Crises [J]. Journal of Finance, 2005, 60: 615647.
[6]  [2]苗文龙. 互联网金融: 模式与风险 [M]. 北京: 经济科学出版社, 2015: 120.
[7]  [7]AGARWAL S, HAUSWALD R. Distance and Private Information in Lending [J]. Review of Financial Studies, 2010, 23: 27572788.
[8]  [1]谢平, 邹传伟, 刘海二. 互联网金融手册 [M]. 北京: 中国人民大学出版社, 2014: 321.
[9]  [3]BOLTON P, FREIXAS X, GAMBACORTA L, et al. Relationship and Transaction Lending in a Crisis [J]. Review of Financial Studies, 2016, 29(10): 26432676.
[10]  [4]BOOT A W A, THAKOR A V. Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition? [J]. Journal of Finance, 2000, 55: 679713.
[11]  [8]PURI M, ROCHOLL J, SASCHA S. On the Importance of Prior Relationships in Bank Loans to Retail Customers [R]. SSRN, 2010, No. 1572673. http:∥ssrn??com/abstract=1572673 or http:∥dx??doi??org/10??2139/ssrn.
[12]  [9]BERGER A N, UDELL G F. Some Evidence on the Empirical Significance of Credit Rationing [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1992, 100: 10471077.
[13]  [10]BERLIN M, MESTER L. Deposits and Relationship Lending [J]. Review of Financial Studies, 1999, 12: 579607.
[14]  [11]HOLMSTROM B, TIROLE J. Financial Intermediation, Loan??able Funds and the Real Sector [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997, 112: 663691.

Full-Text

Contact Us

service@oalib.com

QQ:3279437679

WhatsApp +8615387084133