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- 2015
基于TWPos内核完整性保护
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Abstract:
内核rookits攻击对内核的完整性构成致命威胁,因此对内核rootkits防护是内核完整性保护的重点。当前研究主要侧重于内核rootkits探测和防护,不足之处在于:1) rootkits防护存在单一保护模式;2) 内核rootkits探测只能做探测使用,即便发现内核已经受到攻击,也无能为力。鉴于这种情况,该文设计了一种内核完整性保护方法,采用安全认证保护和探测恢复两种方式(TWPos)保护操作系统,同时具备探测和防护能力,即便内核受到攻击也能进行恢复。实验表明,TWPos系统既能全面有效的防护,而且又不牺牲系统性能,并且兼容多种OS系统。
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