民营企业的政治关联、员工福利与企业业绩——基于中国制造业的实证研究
Political connection,employee's benefits and corporate performance: Empirical evidence from Chinese manufacturing industries

以2008-2014年沪深两市制造业A股的民营企业为样本，基于高管政治关联的视角，探究政治关联对员工福利及其对企业业绩的影响机制。研究发现：政治关联企业的员工福利并不高，且代表类关联企业更低。进一步看，高管具有政治关联损害企业业绩，但在有政治关联的情况下提高员工福利将促进企业业绩，且代表类关联企业改善业绩的作用更大。说明不同于一般认识，政治关联企业对员工责任存在扭曲现象，往往出于内部经营发展需求，忽视员工福利等基本保障。然而民营企业建立政治关联是情理之中，通过构建良好的员工福利保障体系可以弥补经营效率缺陷，从而帮助企业实现寻租利益。
Based on the data(2008-2014) of Chinese listed private firms in manufacturing industries,the paper studies how political connection affects the behavior of employee's benefits and furthermore affects firm performance. We find that political connection firms don't have a higher employee's benefits as expected,though the representative connection has a more negative effect; furthermore,usually firms with political connection have a worse performance but the better employee's benefits do improve their performance,and the role of representative connection plays more. The results suggest that different from common sense,enterprises with political connection take a twisted responsibility for employees. Usually they neglect basic security such as employee's benefits due to the demand for operation and development. However,it's reasonable for private listed firms to establish the political connection,besides a better security system of employee's benefit can make up the inefficiency of operation,which can help achieve rent benefit and improve their performance.