家族控制、机构投资者与高管薪酬
Family control, institutional investors and executive compensation

文章以中国上市公司2007-2013年的数据为研究对象，实证考察了家族控制、机构投资者持股对高管薪酬的影响。结果发现，家族控制能够显著抑制上市公司高管薪酬以及超额薪酬；家族控制并没有对上市公司高管薪酬业绩敏感性产生显著影响；机构投资者持股能够显著提高上市公司高管薪酬以及薪酬业绩敏感性；机构投资者持股能够显著提高非家族高管上市公司高管薪酬，但并没有显著提高家族高管上市公司高管薪酬。
Using a sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies for the period 2007-2013, this paper empirically tests the impact of family control and institutional investors on executive compensation. We find that family control curbs the level of executive compensation and the excess level of executive compensation. However, we do not observe a significant effect of family control on pay-performance sensitivity; We show that institutional ownership is associated with higher level of executive compensation and pay-performance sensitivity; institutional ownership can remarkably improve executive compensation of the family listed companies, but compared the family listed companies with professional managers; institutional ownership does not obviously improve executive compensation of the listed companies with family executives.