终极所有权结构和代理问题的严重性与公司业绩
Ultimate Ownership Structure, Severity of Agency Problems and Firm Corporate Performance

文章讨论了上市公司终极所有权结构、代理问题严重性及公司业绩三者相互之间可能存在的内生性问题,并以2004-2010年118家涉农上市公司面板数据为基础,构建三阶段最小二乘模型对三者关系进行分析。结果表明,两类代理问题严重性对终极所有权结构具有显著的负向影响,终极所有权结构对第二类代理问题严重性的负向作用显著,但对第一类代理问题严重性影响甚微;公司业绩明显地对两类代理问题严重性产生负面影响,但两类代理问题严重性对公司业绩的作用尚不明了;终极所有权结构对公司业绩的正向作用以及公司业绩对终极所有权结构的负向影响均很显著。
Based upon theory of ultimate ownership structure and principal-agent theory, this article raises the problems of endogeny, which is very likely to exist between ultimate ownership structure, severity of agency problems and firm performance. So the author collected panel data of 118 agricultural listed firms during 2004-2010, and constructed three-stage least square model to analyze the complicate relationships between these variables mentioned above. There were some interesting findings as following: firstly, both severities of two types of agency problems played striking negative role in ultimate ownership structure, and ultimate ownership structure was very remarkable negative to the severity of second type agency problem. Next, outcomes of the empirical analysis certified that firm performance had a great influence on the gravity of agency problems, while it could not draw a safe conclusion that two kinds of agency problems’ seriousness had impact on performance of firms. At last, ultimate ownership structure had great positive impact on firm’s performance, which, however, played a distinct negative role in ultimate ownership structure.