互惠偏好下基于不同博弈时序的团队激励与效率比较
Efficiency comparison of team incentives based on different game timing under reciprocity

考虑团队成员的互惠偏好特征，把互惠心理损益引入效用函数，构建了同时描述能力水平差异和互惠强度差异的团队生产博弈模型，研究互惠偏好在不同博弈时序下影响团队效率的内在机理。结果表明：互惠偏好能够帕累托改进团队生产效率，而且这种改进与能力水平差异关；只要后行动者是互惠的，在序贯博弈下的改进程度比在静态博弈下更大，而且与代理人的行动顺序关。因此，委托人应该选择互惠者组建团队，并安排行动顺序确保序贯博弈。这为团队生产中委托人的存在意义提供新的经济理论解释，也为团队激励提供新的思路。
By incorporating the reciprocity into the utility function, this paper develops a game model of team production, which descripts the ability and the reciprocity simultaneously, to probe the intrinsic mechanism by which the reciprocity influences the team efficiency under different game timing. It is found that the reciprocity may promote the Pareto improvement of the team efficiency, which is irrelative with the ability. As long as the final mover is a reciprocal instead of a standard self-interest one, the extent of Pareto improvement under sequential game is bigger than that under simultaneous game even if agents except the final reciprocal one move randomly. Therefore, the principal should select reciprocal agents to establish team and to ensure that the agents move sequentially. It offers a new theoretical explanation for the existence of the principal, and a new approach for team incentives.