中国行政公益诉讼的法理检视
On administrative public interest litigation of China from the perspective of jurisprudence

近10余年来，论是学界还是实务界皆对公益诉讼这个命题关注有加，尤其是对行政公诉，大量研究成果系统性地介绍了西方国家的行政公诉机制。但是，中国的检察机关从权力性质上讲是司法机关，从功能定位上说是宪法所专门规设的法律监督机关。如果置法治语境于不顾，强行赋予检察机关以不符宪法定位的公益诉讼人身份，不仅存在着难以克服的滥诉风险，而且由此带入行政公益诉讼程序中还会引发诉讼本身的异变，继而生成一系列不利于公益保护的负面效应。然而这并非检察机关刻意为之，归根到底还是法律监督疲软力的问题。所以，为了行政公益诉讼的良好实施还需回到原点，在司法改革的背景下进一步完善法律监督机制及其运行架构。
In last ten years, academic circle and judicial circle are both interested in public interest litigation. Specially, a large number of researches present western system of administrative public interest litigation. However, China's procuratorates are judicial authorities, and their function is legal supervision. In China's legal context, the identity of public interest agent of procuratorates is incompatible with the spirit of the constitution. It will initiate indiscriminate lawsuits and then mutation of lawsuits, and give rise to a set of negative influences. However, all of these problems are not procuratorates' intention. That procuratorates cannot obtain the power of censoring abstract administrative act illustrates the weakness of legal supervision. So, we ought to improve the system of legal supervision and its framework in the background of judicial reform.