地方政府干预与劳动收入份额：基于分税制的视角*
LOCAL GOVERNMENT INTERVENE AND LABOR INCOME SHARE: BASED ON THE TAX DECENTRALIZATION IN CHINA#br#

摘要 既有文献对中国劳动收入份额下降成因的解释集中在资本深化、产业结构转变、技术进步、全球化、二元经济、制度转型以及财政和融资约束等宏观和微观路径等方面，本文在分税制背景下从地方政府干预这一新的视角出发，解读中国劳动收入份额下降这一现象。本文首先探讨地方政府干预恶化制度环境，并进一步导致劳动收入份额下降的作用机制。然后，笔者运用1984—2015年的省际面板数据，建立实证模型并分析。本文研究发现，政府干预下的制度环境是导致劳动收入份额下降的主要原因。如果要提高劳动收入份额，就应该减少地方政府的干预，塑造良好的制度软环境。本文在控制内生性问题和其他潜在的各种影响因素后，上述结论仍具有稳健性。
Abstract： From a new perspectivelocal government intervention in the context of tax distribution system，this paper tries to make a reasonable explanation for the continued decline in the labor income share in ChinaOur explanation is different from the ideas in existing literature，which focus on macroand micropath of the role of capital deepening，industrial structural change，technological progress，globalization，dual economy，institutional restructuring and financial and financial，etcThis paper discusses the local government intervention worsening institutional environment，and further lead to the decline of labor income share mechanismThen，we apply the 1984—2015 provincial panel data to establish an empirical model and analyze itThe results show as followsThe deterioration of the institutional environment and local government intervention has significantly inhibited on labor income shareIn order to improve labor income share，it requires to reduce local government intervention and to create a health institutional environmentAfter controlling the endogenous problems and other potential anomalies various factors，the above conclusions are still robust