地方官员激励、制度环境与要素市场扭曲*——基于中国省级面板数据的实证研究
LOCAL OFFICIALS INCENTIVE, INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND FACTOR MARKET DISTORTION——An Empirical Analysis Based on Chinas Provincial Panel Data

摘要 探寻地方官员干预要素市场的动因是治理中国要素市场扭曲的前提，而地方官员对要素市场的干预可能主要源于财政、晋升和寻租等方面的激励。本文基于对现有文献的梳理和归纳，理论上分析了地方官员激励影响要素市场扭曲的机理，并利用中国省级层面面板数据对理论假说加以检验。研究发现：地方官员的财政激励、晋升激励和寻租激励对地区要素市场都产生了显著的扭曲效应，而“入世”后的这种扭曲效应下降了。在不同制度环境中，地方官员激励对要素市场扭曲的影响存在着差异。金融和法律环境的改善以及产权明晰程度的提高，能够在一定程度上规避地方官员激励对要素市场产生的扭曲效应。本文既拓展了官员激励和要素市场扭曲等研究领域，又启发了中国要素市场扭曲的治理方向。
Abstract： :It is the premise to govern the China factor market distortions that exploring the internal reasons of the local officials intervening in factors marketThe motivation which local officials have intervened on the factor market may come from financial incentive, promotion incentive and rentseeking incentive Based on the existing literature, this paper theoretically discusses the mechanism of local officials incentive affecting on factors market distortion It tests the theoretical hypothesis, using the Chinas provincial panel data The results show that the fiscal incentives, promotion incentives and rent seeking incentives have significant effects on the factors market distortion In different institutional environment, the effects of local officials incentive on the factor market distortion are different Moreover, the improvement of financial and legal environment as well as clear property right can avoid the effect of local officials incentive on the factor market distortion in a certain extent This paper not only expands the research field of officials incentive and factor market distortion, but also inspires the direction of governing the factor market distortion.