政企合谋、环境规制与企业全要素生产率*
GOVERNMENTFIRM COLLUSION, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND FIRMS TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY

摘要 本文利用中国工业企业数据库和地级市层面的企业治污投资数据构建了一个2003—2007年的面板，实证检验了环境规制对企业全要素生产率的影响以及政企合谋在背后的作用。实证结果表明，用企业治污投资占工业增加值比重衡量的环境规制强度每上升1%，企业当期的生产率下降约1%。当政企合谋可能性上升时，环境规制对企业生产率的边际影响在减弱，说明政企合谋带来的监管放松和处罚不力弱化了环境规制对合谋企业生产率的影响。本文的政策启示在于中央政府应加强环保领域统一执法，破解囚徒困境式的环境规制。同时，本文的发现为环保机构监测监察执法垂直管理制度改革提供了合理性依据。
Abstract： By establishing a panel dataset ranging from 2003 to 2007 with annual survey of industrial firms and prefecturelevel data on firms investment in pollution control, this paper investigates how regionlevel environmental regulation affects manufacturers total factor productivity and how governmentfirm collusion compromises this effect. We find that firms contemporaneous TFP decreases by 1% when the intensity of environmental regulation, measured by the ratio of firms pollution abatement and control investment to value added, increases by 1%. The possibility that local government colludes with polluting firms mitigates this negative marginal effect. We believe the reciprocal governmentfirm collusion enables the favored firms to escape from rigorous regulation with lenient regulations and penalties. The policy implication of this paper is the central government should adopt unified law enforcement to escape from prisoners dilemma of environmental regulation. We also provide justification for the reform of vertical management system in monitoring polluting firms and enforcing laws by environment agencies.