地方政府性债务治理与上市企业投融资*——基于我国247座城市的初步证据
GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC BORROWINGS, AND INVESTMENT AND FINANCING OF LOCAL LISTED FIRMS——Initial Evidence from 247 Key Chinese Cities

摘要 本文利用中国社科院披露的我国247座城市地方政府性债务对金融稳定影响的评价指数，分析了地方政府性债务治理对上市企业债务融资与资本性投资效率的影响及其传导机理。研究发现，与地方政府性债务治理较好地区相比，处于地方政府性债务治理较差地区的地方政府控股国企，其杠杆率均显著较高，但企业资本性投资效率却显著较低，企业产能过剩的财务特征十分明显。这表明，地方政府性债务治理会显著影响微观企业的投融资，并且地方政府性债务治理越差，透过政府对经济活动的控制或干预，通过预算外举债，政府“杠杆”有转化为企业“杠杆”的风险。本文明确了“去杠杆”究竟应去谁的“杠杆”问题，对理解地方政府性债务治理转变为“内涵型”经济增长的微观基础具有重要的理论和现实意义。
Abstract： The paper utilizes 2013—2014 financial ecological environment evaluation indexes of 247 cities reported by financial institute at Chinese Academy of Social Science in year 2015 and explores the impact channels of governance of local public borrowing on corporate debt financing and investment efficiency of listed firms registered at these cities. Our results show compared to firms registered at regions with better governance of local public government borrowing, corporate leverage ratio for local SOEs measured by total debt, bank loan and longterm bank loan to total asset ratio is significantly higher than that registered at regions with poorer governance of local public government borrowing, but their capital investment efficiency is significantly lower, which means that corporate overproduction issue is obviously serious. The paper provides evidence that governance of local public government borrowing could to a certain extent contribute to the corporate debt financing and capital investment. Through government resource control and economic intervention, there bearing the risk of transferring local public “leverage” into corporate “leverage” by government offbudget borrowings. Our findings provide evidence and also specify the issue that whose “leverage” should be delevered firstly, which has important theoretical and policy implications for understanding microfoundation between governance of local public borrowing and quality economic growth.