高管的风险态度与股权激励方式选择*
THE EXECUTIVES RISK ATTITUDE AND THE EQUITY INCENTIVE METHOD#br#

摘要 公司如何选择有效的股权激励方式一直是理论研究的重要话题。本文以2006—2016年中国A股实行股权激励的上市公司为研究对象，探究高管的风险态度差异对上市公司股权激励方式选择的影响。研究结果显示，高管的风险回避倾向越强，公司越倾向于授予风险较大的股票期权方式激励高管，以激发高管的风险承担意愿；高管的风险承担水平越高，公司则越倾向于采用风险较小的限制性股票期权方式进行激励，以削弱高管的过度风险追求倾向。进一步研究表明，当股权激励方式基于风险承担与高管的风险态度相匹配时，公司会有更好的业绩表现。本文的研究结论为激励契约设计提供了重要启示。
Abstract： How to select effective equity incentive method has always been an important topic in theoretical researchThis paper analyzes the impact of executives risk attitude on the company equity incentive method，using Ashare listed companies as research sample which announced implementation of equity incentive during 2006—2016The results indicate that if the risk aversion tendency of executive is stronger，the company is more inclined to grant riskier stock options to motivate executives to be more risktakingIf the senior executives are more strongly tend to take risk，the shareholders prefer to take restricted stock with lower risk to undermine executives excessive risk pursuitThe further study shows that if incentive method meets with the executives risk preference based on risktaking logic，the company will have a better future performanceThe conclusion of this study provides important implications for the design of incentive contracts