面向最终用户的建筑市场逆向多属性电子招投标博弈分析
Game analysis of reverse multiple attribute electronic bidding in construction markets for end users

建筑市场电子招投标平台的推广，优化了建筑市场的资源配置，增强了企业市场竞争能力，有效防止了不正当竞争行为的发生。但建筑市场电子招投标平台存在着市场响应机制缺乏的短板，其在招投标中并未对最终用户的建筑质量要求等诉求进行全面响应，使得最终用户满意度越来越低。该文结合建筑产品的特点及建筑市场对多属性电子招投标的需求，从建筑市场最终用户的角度，以施工招投标为例，建立了两阶段拍卖模型，即网上逆向多属性拍卖模型和不完全信息条件下无限回合的合同降价谈判模型，扩展了投标者的成本函数，分析了其均衡策略，得到第1阶段模型的Bayes-Nash均衡策略，并推导了第2阶段模型招投标方的期望效用。结果表明：模型的建立响应了最终用户的相关诉求，降低了建筑产业供应链的总成本，从整体上提高了建筑产业供应链的竞争力，具有一定的指导和推广意义。
Abstract：Electronic bidding platforms optimize resource allocation for the construction market and effectively prevent unfair competition. However, electronic bidding platforms for the construction market lack a response mechanism to the end users' demands, such as building quality, resulting in lower end-user satisfaction. The characteristics of the construction market, especially the demands of the end-users and the need for multi- attribute electronic bidding are incorporated into a two-stage auction model which includes an online multi-attribute reverse auction model and a bargaining game model with incomplete information and unlimited rounds. The solutions of the two stage model compared to the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy and the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. This model successfully responds to the end-user demands, reduces the total supply chain cost, and improves the construction industry supply chain competitiveness.