期权激励与管理层择机行权研究
Stock incentive and manipulation of option exercise dates

摘 要： 以2007―2015年实施股票期权激励的上市公司为样本，利用单变量统计分析方法和Logit回归模型实证检验了行权过程中管理层的择机行为。研究发现：管理层存在择机行权的行为，潜在个人所得税税负的节约金额会显著提高择机行权的概率；与行权前相比，行权后上市公司的盈利与现金流量并未显著增加；管理层等期权激励对象在行权过程中没有明显操纵信息披露时机；在行权公告日前，与非择机行权样本相比，择机行权样本的相对交易量显著提高，表明择机行权主要通过内幕交易的方式实现。
Abstract: Using the exercise samples from 2007 to 2015, the present study makes use of univariate test and logit regression to investigate the opportunism timing of stock option exercise by the executives. We find that the managers manipulate the exercise date. The estimated personal tax savings increase the likelihood of selecting the lowest price to exercise the options during a month. And the result indicates that the accounting profits and the cash flow aren’t significant differences between the pre-exercise and post-exercise date. Besides that, the executives do not manipulate the information disclosure. But the change of comparative volume in the timing samples is significantly higher than the other samples before the exercise date, which indicates that the timing behavior is accomplished by the insider trading