情感如何既“生成”又“见证”德性？――评王庆节的“道德感动”说
How can emotion both generate and witness virtues: Remark on Wang Qingjie’s theory of “being morally moved”

摘 要： 王庆节教授提出的“道德感动”说，以“道德感动”为基础，将情感的道德生成作用与道德的见证作用统合在了一起，这对当代情感主义伦理学和情感儒学的发展具有重要意义。不过，王教授的“道德感动”说本身也存在理论困境，即：道德感动如何既是优先的德性生成者，又是后发的德性见证者？事实上，发挥德性生成作用的情感与发挥德性见证作用的情感并不是同一种类型的情感。前者是自然的、未与以往道德经验相捆绑的道德情感(道德生成性情感)，后者是理性化的、与以往道德经验相捆绑的道德情感(道德见证性情感)。只有对这两种情感作出明确的区分，“道德感动”说的内在困境才能消解。
Abstract: The theory of “being morally moved” proposed by Professor Wang Qingjie has great significance to the development of contemporary sentimentalist ethics and emotional Confucianism. This theory takes “being morally moved” as foundation and combines emotions’ functions of both generating and witnessing morals. However, Professor Wang’s theory of “being morally moved” has its theoretical plight. Namely, how can emotion both be the prior generator and the later witness of virtues? Actually, the emotions which play the role of moral generation and the role of moral witness are not of the same kind. The former is of natural moral emotions which are not bundled with past moral experiences, while the latter is of the rationalized emotions which are bundled with past moral experiences. Only when the emotions as moral generator and emotions as moral witness are explicitly distinguished, could the theoretical plight of “being morally moved” theory be dispelled