自明性、先天性和反思：奥迪论伦理直觉主义
Self-evidence, apriority, and reflection: Audi on ethical intuitionism

摘 要： 罗伯特?奥迪是伦理直觉主义在当代最著名的捍卫者之一。他认为，我们的某些道德知识是非推理性的先天知识，这种先天知识是基于某些自明性命题，而反思是达到这种知识的适当方式。在奥迪看来，由于人们的道德直觉是对自明性伦理命题的理解，那么这本身就已经为伦理直觉主义提供了充分的辩护。但是，“自明性概念难以解释”“自明性与先天性关系错综”“反思方式难以界定”等问题，都构成了对奥迪理论的巨大挑战。
Abstract: Robert Audi is one of the most famous defenders of ethical intuitionism in the recent years. He believes that some of our moral knowledge is non-inferential and a priori, which is based on some self-evident propositions, and that the reflection is an appropriate way to acquire such knowledge. Moreover, from Audi’s perspective, people’s moral intuitions are understandings of self-evident moral propositions, which provides sufficient justification for ethical intuitionism itself. However, Audi’s theory is also challenged by such problems as how to explain the concept self-evidence, the labyrinth of the relation between self-evidence and apriority, and the difficulty of defining reflection