职业生涯关注下CEO预期任期对盈余管理行为的影响
Impact of CEO’s expected tenure on earnings management behavior in career concerns

摘 要： 从CEO职业生涯关注视角，选取2007―2014年我国沪深A股上市公司为样本，实证检验CEO预期任期对盈余管理行为的影响。结果发现：CEO预期任期与公司应计和真实盈余管理行为呈负相关关系，说明长的预期任期在某种程度上能抑制公司的盈余管理行为。进一步研究发现，上述结论在非面临换届的样本组中成立，而面临换届压力的样本组中CEO的预期任期不能抑制应计盈余管理行为；当CEO为新任职时，预期任期也不能抑制应计盈余管理行为；对于已过退休年龄的CEO而言，预期任期对应计盈余和真实盈余管理行为均不具有影响关系。
Abstract: By taking the perspective of CEO’s career concerns, the present study selects samples from Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2014 to undertake an empirical test on the impact of CEOs’ expected tenure on earnings management behavior. It is found that the longer the CEO’s expected tenure, the less accrual earnings management and real earnings management of listed companies, which illustrates that longer expected tenure can suppress, to a certain extent, the earnings management in the company. Further study shows that this relationship is also significant in the group without transition pressure. For the group with transition pressure, CEO’s expected tenure does not inhibit accrual earnings management. Besides, this relationship is the same for the new CEO. However, for some CEOs who are over retirement age, expected tenure does not inhibit accrual earnings management and real earnings management