官员晋升锦标赛体制下环境规制、央地分权对环境污染的影响研究
Research about influence of environmental regulation and central-local decentralization policy on environmental pollution in the championship mechanism of official promotion

摘 要： 利用2000―2015年中国31个省级面板数据，采用空间杜宾计量模型，分析环境规制、央地分权对环境污染的影响，进一步考虑官员晋升锦标赛体制下，官员竞争程度对环境规制、央地分权政策的调节效应。结果发现：在不考虑官员竞争程度的条件下，费用型和投资型环境规制能够显著抑制地区环境污染，但是非正式型环境规制的作用并不明显，表明“波特假说”的成立与否与环境规制工具类型紧密相关，同时，央地分权对地区环境污染控制具有显著的抑制作用；在考虑官员竞争程度的条件下，费用型和投资型环境规制显著促进了地区环境污染，同时，央地分权也使得地区环境污染加剧；在相邻地区的影响下，官员竞争程度与环境规制和央地分权的共同作用使得本地区产生“竞争逐底”效应，加剧了本地区的环境污染程度；不同环境规制类型对东部地区和中西部地区环境污染具有差异化的影响，而且官员竞争程度对其也呈现差异化的调节效应。
Abstract: By using China's 31 provincial panel data from 2000 to 2015, and by adopting SDM, the present essay analyzes the influence of environmental regulation and central-local decentralization policy on environmental pollution and explores further into regulatory effects and central-local decentralization policy under the system of official promotion championship. The results show that first, without considering the officer competition, expense-orientated and investment-oriented environmental regulations can effectively control environmental pollution. However, the informal regulation does not play an obvious role, indicating that the establishment of “Porter Hypothesis” is related to the type of regulation instruments. Second, central-local decentralization plays a remarkable role in restraining pollution. When the degree of official competition is concerned, the expense-orientated and investment-oriented environmental regulations facilitate pollution, while central-local decentralization also aggravates environmental pollution. Third, under the influence of adjoining areas, officer competition, environmental regulation and central-local decentralization exert a combined role and give rise to effects of “race to the bottom” in local regions, thereby aggravating local environmental pollution. Four, different types of environmental regulations exert differentiated influences on pollution in eastern and middle-western regions, and official competition adjusts the differentiated effects of regulation. Lastly, specific policies and suggestions were proposed