|
|
- 2018
概念论、非概念论与信念论——基于麦克道尔对自然化理论的探究
|
Abstract:
在麦克道尔的心灵哲学中，“动物是否具有感觉经验”的问题与他的经验论关系密切。作为切入点，通过分析麦克道尔对“感觉经验”的自然主义构想以及国内外一些学者对其理论的批判，“概念论”中存在的根本问题便可清晰地突显出来：由于感觉经验在结构上是“不可分析”的，麦克道尔实际上无法为之提供一种构造性的理论模型，这使得他始终无法为经验命题与“专有感觉”之间的关系提供一种确然的说明。鉴于这一困境是概念论所无法逃避的，即使如唐热风那样将其强化为一种“信念论”，后者仍然无法从根本上改变这种局面。
In McDowell's Philosophy of Mind, the question 'whether animals can have experience' is closely related to his empiricism. Through an analysis of McDowell's Naturalistic Conception of 'Experience' and some philosophers' critiques of his theory, the fundamental problems in his conceptualism can be clearly highlighted:McDowell could not provide us with a Constructive Theoretical Model for Sensory Experience, because the Sensory Experience is structurally 'Unanalyzable'. This makes it impossible for him to provide a clear description of the relationship between the Empirical Proposition and the 'Proper Sense'. Given that the conceptualism cannot escape from this dilemma, even if Tang Refeng is able to strengthen it as a kind of 'Doxasticism', this program still cannot fundamentally change the situation
| [1] | MCDOWELL J. Mind and world[M]. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994. |
| [2] | TANG R. Conceptualism and the new myth of the given[J]. Synthese, 2010, 175(1): 101-122. DOI:10.1007/s11229-009-9529-5 |
| [3] | EVANS G. The varieties of reference[M]. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982: 226-227. |
| [4] | 唐热风. 经验、概念与信念——兼答王华平先生[J]. 哲学研究, 2013(8): 95-103. |
| [5] | MCCULLOCH G. Phenomenological externalism[G]//SMITH N. Reading McDowell: on Mind and World. London and New York: Routledge, 2002: 128. |
| [6] | DAVIDSON D. Knowing one's own mind[J]. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1987, 60(3): 441-458. DOI:10.2307/3131782 |
| [7] | WRIGHT C. Human nature?[G]//SMITH N. Reading McDowell: on Mind and World. London and New York: Routledge, 2002. |
| [8] | MCDOWELL J. Reply to commentators[J]. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1998, 58(2): 403-431. DOI:10.2307/2653521 |
| [9] | Davidson D. Subjective, intersubjective, objective[M]. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001: 143. |
| [10] | MCDOWELL J. Responses[G]//SMITH N. Reading McDowell: on Mind and World. London and New York: Routledge, 2002. |
| [11] | 费多益. 知识的信念假设[J]. 科学技术哲学研究, 2015(4): 11-16. |
| [12] | 王华平. 所予的新神话?——与唐热风商榷[J]. 自然辩证法通讯, 2011(2): 1-6. |
| [13] | WRIGHT C. Postscript to chapter 8[G]//SMITH N. Reading McDowell: on Mind and World. London and New York: Routledge, 2002. |
| [14] | DAVIDSON D. Responses to Barry Stroud, John McDowell, and Tyler Burge[J]. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2003, 67(3): 691-699. DOI:10.1111/phpr.2003.67.issue-3 |
| [15] | 周靖, 陈亚军. 信念的公共性及其证成[J]. 西南大学学报(社会科学版), 2018(1): 33-39. |
| [16] | MCDOWELL J. Having the world in view:essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars[M]. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009. |
