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- 2018
农业面源污染环境税规制机制研究进展
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Abstract:
在点源污染治理取得重大进展的背景下，面源污染问题愈发引起世界各国重视，理论界也形成了丰富的研究成果。通过对环境税规制农业面源污染的重要文献进行梳理，对不完全信息、道德风险、合作共谋等因素对环境税规制农业面源污染有效性的影响的分析，对当前该领域的研究进展和典型成果做了一个综述总结，并在此基础上评述了现有文献的贡献和不足，大胆提出了未来研究的方向。
Against the background of significant progress in point source pollution control, the problem of non-point source pollution has attracted more and more attention from all over the world. In this paper, important literatures on environmental tax regulation of agricultural non-point source pollution are reviewed. This paper analyzes the impact of incomplete information, moral hazard, cooperation and other factors on the efficiency of environmental tax regulation of agricultural non-point source pollution, summarizes the current research progress in this field, and points out the contribution and insufficiency of existing literatures, and boldly puts forward the research direction in the future
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