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- 2018
信念的公共性及其证成
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Abstract:
不存在私人信念，信念在本质上是公共的，它已经隐含相应的行动中所包含的事件之间的解释关系。能动者不可能获得孤立的信念，获得一个信念需要获有为共同体所共享的信念整体。这意味着能动者的信念亦能为他者所理解和接受，并在公共的维度中得到证成。证成信念的起点是可被观察的行为和断言，戴维森和布兰顿的相关思想为我们提供了证成信念的解释进路和推论主义进路。最后以“摩尔悖论”为例，探究了“信念本质上是公共的”这一观点的一个运用。
There is no such thing called private belief. Belief is essentially public. A belief is already embedded with the explanatory power that the events of the corresponding action take. Agents cannot have an isolated belief. To have a belief is to be committed to the whole system of beliefs shared by the community, which implies that the belief can be understood and accepted by the other, and can be justified from a shared perspective. To justify an agent's belief, we should start from the agent's observable behaviors and assertions. Davidson's and Brandom's relevant thoughts are helpful in justifying public belief along the interpretative and inferential routines respectively. The idea of public belief is also illuminated in solving some problems concerning belief, such as 'the Moore's paradox'
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