基于随机需求和消费者意识的双回收渠道闭环供应链研究
Research of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Dual Recycling Channel Based on Random Demand and Consumer's Environmental Awareness

在市场需求不确定和消费者具有环保意识的情形下，考虑市场需求依赖销售价格，建立了由制造商和零售商共同参与回收的Stackelberg博弈模型.在集中决策和分散决策两种情形下探讨了闭环供应链中各成员的最优决策问题，并分析了两种情形下消费者环保意识对制造商和零售商最优决策的影响.研究表明：集中决策情形下消费者环保意识的增加有利于整个供应链系统，分散决策情形下消费者环保意识的增加只有利于制造商而不利于零售商.
Based on the condition that market demand is uncertain and consumers are environment-aware and taking into consideration the fact that market demand is dependent on sale price, we establish, in this paper, a Stackelberg game model, in which the manufacturer and the retailer are jointly involved in recycling. In the case of centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making, we study the optimal decision-making problem of each member in the closed-loop supply chain, and then make a qualitative and a quantitative analysis of the influence of consumer's environmental awareness on the optimal decision of the manufacturer and the retailer. The results show that in the case of centralized decision-making the increase in consumer's environment awareness is beneficial to the entire supply chain system, but in the case of decentralized decision-making the increase in consumer's environment awareness is beneficial to the manufacturer only