企业社会责任与供应链产品质量选择及协调契约研究
A Study on Corporate Social Responsibility, Product Quality Choice and Coordination Contracts in Supply Chains

摘要 针对“企业社会责任（CSR）是否有助于提高供应链中的产品质量”这一问题，构建一个由上游制造商和下游零售商组成的两阶段供应链博弈模型，研究制造商CSR对供应链均衡运作结果的影响。研究结果表明：制造商CSR程度的增加，促进了产品质量、产品需求和利益相关者经济业绩的增加，但制造商经济利润降低；质量改进效率的增加，提高了产品质量、产品需求和利益相关者经济业绩，但是制造商经济利润如何变化依赖于CSR程度和质量改进效率的相对大小；一个由数量折扣合同和质量改进成本分担合同构成的供应链契约，可以实现供应链系统协调；零售商实施CSR行为可使产品质量和产品需求更高。
According to the question of whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) enhances the product quality provided by supply chains, a two-stage game model in a supply chain consisting of an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer is built to investigate how the manufacturer’s CSR affects the equilibrium operating results of the supply chain. The results shows that：an increase in the degree of the manufacturer’s CSR increases the product quality, the product demand and the stakeholders’ economic profit, but reduces the manufacturer’s economic profit; the product quality, the product demand and the stakeholders’ economic profit increase with the product quality improvement efficiency, but how the manufacturer’s economic profit changes depends on the relative size of the degree of CSR and the quality improvement efficiency. A proper combination of a quantity discount contract and a quality improvement cost sharing contract can effectively coordinate the operations of the supply chain. The CSR activity implemented by the retailer leads to a higher product quality level and a higher product demand