突发事件下应急服务供应链的期权协同决策
Coordination optional contract mechanism of service supply chain for emergencies

摘要： 针对突发事件下应急服务所具有的订货提前期长,实施时间短,且残值极低的特点进行分析,将期权合约引入应急服务供应链,构建突发事件下应急服务供应链的期权协同决策模型。首先通过对应急服务集成商和供应商的收益优化分析,得到一定期权合约下集成商的最优订购策略。再通过最优期权合约参数建立应急服务供应链的协同机制,根据对整体应急服务供应链收益优化分析,指出期权合约下应急服务供应链的整体决策优于其单独决策。然后分析突发事件下供应商的成本和价格的变化导致集成商的需求和期权购买量变化的规律。最后通过具体算例分析,指出随着突发事件发生风险参数的增加,集成商会增加最优订购量而提高收益,且随着集成商准确充分地掌握突发事件发生信息,即可做出更为准确的决策。
Abstract: Based on the review of service properties for emergencies such as an early order in advance, a short implement time, and lower residual value, an optional contract model of service supply chain for emergencies was presented by introducing optional contracts in the traditional service supply chain for emergencies. First, an optimized order strategy of the supply chain integrator under certain optional contracts was derived by analysis of different interests of the integrator and suppliers. Second, a coordination mechanism of service supply chain for emergencies was suggested on parameters of optional contracts, and the profits of general logistics service supply chain were optimized, which reveals that the integrated decision was much better the individual decision in an optional contract supply chain. Third, it was discussed that the changing principle of demand and option order cause by variation of supplies' price and cost under emergencies. Final, a case study was applied to testify that the optimal order quantity will increase with the increase of probability of emergent events, and it will help make more precise decision when integrator can predict information about emergent events