一个基于双向声誉机制的网络平台重复信任博弈模型

网络平台的机制设计直接影响交易者的行为决策和平台的健康发展.本文根据网络平台的特征，将 Laureti的互联网交易机制模型中的信誉评价由买方对卖方的单方面评价扩展到交易双方的互评，并对两阶段 信任博弈模型进行了拓展，构建了一个基于声誉机制的重复信任博弈模型，更好地解释了网络平台交易双方 行为产生的动因和网络平台信任机制的动态演化过程.通过模型分析得出结论：有效的声誉机制会促进参与者 信任度的提高；网络平台只要能提供给参与者有效的历史信息，并建立起声誉机制，则不论是有限次的博弈 还是无限次的博弈，参与者都将选择信任，且信任的程度与声誉机制的具体参数密切相关.
Themechanismdesignofthenetworkplatformdirectlyaffectsthebehaviordecisionofthetraderandthe healthydevelopmentofthenetworkplatform.Accordingtothecharacteristicsofthenetworkplatform,thispaperextends thereputationevaluationofLaureti′sInternettradingmechanismmodelfromthebuyer′sunilateralevaluationofthesell? ertothemutualevaluationsbetweenthetwoparties,andextendsthetwo-stagetrustgamemodelaswell.Thepapercon? structsa repeatedtrustgamemodelbasedonreputationmechanismtofurtherexplainthemotivationofthebothparties′ behaviorandthetrustmechanism′sdynamicevolutionofthenetworkplatform.Throughtheanalysisofthemodel,the conclusionsareasfollows:Aneffectivereputationmechanismdoespromotethetrustdegreeoftheparticipants.Aslong asthenetworkplatformcanprovidetheparticipantswithsomeeffectivehistoricalinformationandestablishareputation mechanism,theparticipantswillchoosetrustwhetherthegameislimitedorinfinite.Andtheresearchconclusionalso showsthatthetrustdegreeiscloselyrelatedtothespecificparametersofreputationmechanism.