采用多尺度主成分分析的控制系统欺骗攻击检测

针对工业控制系统中存在的正弦欺骗攻击，以控制系统的典型回路为研究对象，建立数学模型；利用傅里叶变换、小波分析，从时间-尺度域分析其在攻击能力和隐蔽性方面与一般性欺骗攻击的不同特性；将多尺度主元分析（MSPCA）用于正弦攻击检测，提出在线检测算法.在TE过程上进行仿真研究，结果表明，正弦攻击不但能够造成物理破坏，而且伤害较隐蔽.当正弦攻击的频率较高时，通过传统的主成分分析（PCA）方法无法检测，所提出的方法能快速准确地检测出攻击.
Abstract: As industrial control system is threatened by sinusoidal attack, the mathematical model was established using a typical loop of the control system; the Fourier transform and wavelet analysis was used to analyze its different characteristics in the aspect of attack ability and concealment. Then, an algorithm was developed against sinusoidal attack using multi-scale principal component analysis (MSPCA) with online implementation. Simulation of sinusoidal attack on Tenessee Eastman (TE) process show that sinusoidal attack not only causes physical damage, but also conceals the damage. When the frequency of sinusoidal attack is higher, the attack can not be detected by the traditional principal component analysis (PCA) method, meanwhile, our method can detect the attack quickly and accurately.