论罗尔斯正义理论中权利平等与道德卓越的内在关联

在《正义论》第三编中,罗尔斯通过关联“善”和“正当”这两个概念阐释了其道德价值概念,并由此将“卓越”这一道德理念纳入其义务论的伦理评价体系,这使他能够比较容易地处理“分外的行为”这样的道德问题。但是,另一方面,这一对卓越的追求以及与此相关的对个体内在价值的区分和评判却可能与作为罗尔斯正义理论基础的平等观相抵牾。为了避免冲突,罗尔斯通过区分政治与道德,以及道德的正当与就其自身而言并无道德意义的价值(善)概念等策略,寻求一种可以在坚持个体平等的权利之同时容纳价值和道德价值的区分以及对卓越的追求的可能性。本文在重构这些经常隐蔽于其文本中的策略之同时也揭示了它们的局限性,因为与其他价值(善)不同,道德价值既是一种价值(善),又是已经受到正当制约因而是道德的价值,所以,我们不可能在权利问题上如同悬搁其他价值差别一样不考虑道德价值的人际差异。鉴于这一困难,本文尝试借助于罗尔斯所阐释的两种道德情操,即正义感和人类之间的相继关系来显明罗尔斯所言的两种道德观,即“分外的道德”与“互惠和平等的道德”融合于一个整全的道德概念之中的可能性。如果我们将尊严视为一个基于人类之爱的理念,而不只是罗尔斯所言的基于道德能力最低值的政治与法律权利,那么,平等的自由与卓越追求之间就不仅互不抵牾,而且可能相辅相成,因为卓越最终是在平等的自由中所追求的完善和自我完善,而平等的权利则构成了个体自由地同时也是在与他人的关系中追求卓越的必不可少的条件。
Abstract：In Book III of his A Theory of Justice, John Rawls works out a concept of moral worth through a connection between the right and the good. By this means, he incorporates an aspiration to the excellence or moral ideal into his contract-deontological ethical theory. However, this aspiration and the relevant value judgment with respect to the individual inner value can pose a serious challenge to the idea of equality underlying Rawls' theory of justice. Based on a careful analysis of his theory of moral worth, this essay further explores Rawls' efforts to lay out the moral ideal while insisting on the equality of individual rights. It tries to reveal the possibility of the two morals which are stated by Rawls, i.e. extra moral and reciprocal and equal moral, incorporated into a wholesome moral concept. If the respect is considered as an idea based on human's love instead of merely the political and law rights based on the minimum moral, then the equal freedom and the excellence pursuit can be complementary to each other. Because excellence is fundamentally self-improvement and the excellence being pursued in equal freedom, and the equal rights that constitute the individual freedom is a necessary permise in pursuing excellence in social network.