存在（理智上可辩护的）法律教义学么？――论法条主义、通说与法学的智识责任

法条主义以及法教义学的核心命题包含着以下疑问：通说的存在是否真的有助于我们解决部门法中的实践问题？教义学的“融贯性―体系性”究竟是怎样的标准？法教义学又如何以这一标准来理解法律实践？更一般地说，以达成通说并致力于务实地解决司法实践问题的法教义学是否是法学研究的好典范？对法律解释合理性的深度反思表明，法教义学的两个根本前提之间存在着不可消解的内在矛盾，无法有效辩护自身立场。法教义学家过于单薄地理解了法律实践的意义，因而在根本上误解了自己的主张。理智上可辩护的法学是一种以理论化的方式理解法律实践的学问。法学是法理之学。
There are several puzzles long haunted the dogmatic theory of law: Whether received opinions (herrschende Meinung) could really solve the practical issues in legal adjudication? What is the nature of the coherence requirement in legal reasoning? How does this coherence requirement fit into its scheme of legal practice? More generally, does the dogmatic theory of law aiming at producing received opinions really represent a good paradigm of legal scholarship? A close analytical treatment will lead us to the conclusion that the two major commitments of the dogmatic theory of law have irresolvable internal conflicts and thus its whole position is self-defeating. Legal dogmatists misunderstood their own position profoundly due to their extremely thin conception of legal practice they have. Intellectually defensible legal scholarship is a theory-oriented study of law aiming at providing Fali (Ratio Juris) for positive law and legal practice.