当前我国农产品优质优价机制尚未建立,实现安全农产品溢价存在一定困难,而农民专业合作社内部又存在成员异质性明显、治理结构不够完善等问题,集体行动理论表明合作社很可能由于无法解决搭便车问题而陷入质量安全控制不力的困境。本文基于浙江省76家农民专业合作社调研数据对合作社质量安全控制水平进行了分析,并依托扩展的集体行动分析框架对合作社规模、结构、治理规则与合作社质量安全控制的关系进行了实证分析。研究结果表明合作社在农产品质量安全控制方面有积极作用,但不同合作社质量安全控制水平差异较大,且这种差异与其规模、成员异质性显著相关。In China, formal management system for agri-products’ fine quality and best price has not been established, and the members of specialized collectives are heterogeneous and the structure of the governance is not perfect. The collective action theory shows that collectives may fall into the dilemma of weak quality and safety control due to the problem of free riders. However, through the analysis of survey data on 76 farmer cooperatives in Zhejiang Province and the empirical analysis on the relationship between collectives’ size, structure, and governance regulations on the one side and the collectives’ quality safety control with the help of an extended theoretical framework about collective action, we find most of the samples can effectively control their product quality, but their control levels are widely different among various collectives, and such difference is related to the collectives’ size and the heterogeneity of their membership
