Benoit J P, Krishna V. Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders [J]. Review of Economic Studies, 2001,68(1):155-179. [2] Che Y K, Gale I. Standard auctions with financially constrained bidders[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1998, 65(1): 1-21. [3] Che Y K, Gale I. The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer[J]. Journal of Econo-mic Theory, 2000, 92(2): 198-233. [4] Che Y K, Gale I, Kim J. Assigning resources to budget-constrained agents[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 2013, 80(1): 73-107. [5] Chen X, Zhao J. Bidding to drive: Vehicle license auction policy in Shanghai and its public acceptance[J]. Transport Policy, 2013, 27: 39-52. [6] Chu S F, Winston T, Koh H, et al. Expectations formation and forecasting of vehicle demand: An empi-rical study of the vehicle quota auctions in Singapore[J]. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 2004, 38(5): 367-381. [7] Condorelli D. Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources[J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, 82: 582-591. [8] Evans M, Vossler C, Flores N. Hybrid allocation mechanism for publicly provided goods[J]. Journal of Public Economics, 2009, 93(1): 311-325. [9] Huang Y, Wen Q. Hybrid mechanism: Theory, practice and empirical analysis[R]. Working Paper, 2014. [10] Koh W, Mariano R, Tse Y K. Open versus sealed bid auctions: Testing for revenue equivalence under Singapore's vehicle quota system[J]. Applied Economics, 2003, 39(1): 125-134. [11] Krishna V.Auction theory[M]. Academic Press,2010. [12] Li S. Better lucky than rich? Welfare analysis of automobile license allocations in Beijing and Shanghai[R]. Working Paper, 2014. [13] Liao E Z, Holt C A. The pursuit of revenue reduction: An experimental analysis of the Shanghai license plate auction[R]. Working Paper, 2013. [14] Pai M M, Vohra R. Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers[J].Journal of Economic Theory, 2014, 150: 383-425. [15] Phang S Y, Wong W K, Chia N C. Singapore's experience with car quotas: Issues and policy processes[J]. Transport Policy, 1996, 3(4): 145-153. [16] Pitchik C, Schotter A. Perfect equilibria in budget-constrained sequential auctions: An experimental study[J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 1988, 19(3): 363-388. [17] Pitchik C. Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information[J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, 66(2): 928-949. [18] Richter M. Mechanism design with budget constrains and a continuum of agents[R]. Working Paper, 2013. [19] Rong J, Sun N, Wang D. Equality of allocation mechanisms: An application for vehicle license allocations in China[R].Working Paper, 2015. [20] Talman A J J, Yang Z. An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders[J]. International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, 44(3):769-784. [21] Xiao J, Zhou X, Hu W M. Vehicle quota system and its impact on the Chinese auto markets: A tale of two cities[R]. Working Paper, 2014.
