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物流联盟协同创新的两阶段动态激励模型

, PP. 94-101

Keywords: 物流工程,物流联盟,协同创新,收入共享,激励系数,努力水平,委托代理

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Abstract:

为了提高物流联盟的协同水平与收入状况,以盟主(第三方物流)的收入为目标函数,以盟员的激励相容和保留收入为约束条件,建立了物流联盟协同创新的两阶段动态激励模型。当协同和创新2项任务成本的可替代程度变化时,计算了最优激励系数与最优努力水平,并比较了单期静态与两阶段动态激励下盟员的固定收入与盟主的收入。分析结果表明当盟员的保留收入为60万元,可替代程度分别为0.2、0.3、0.4、0.5、0.6、0.7时,单期静态激励下盟员的固定收入分别为-108.77、-109.53、-108.48、-106.30、-103.34、-99.93万元,两阶段动态激励下盟员的固定收入分别为-123.67、-110.65、-99.51、-89.83、-81.62、-74.47万元;单期静态激励下盟主的收入分别为109.22、110.09、109.11、106.95、103.95、100.32万元,两阶段动态激励下盟主的收入分别为124.54、111.72、100.73、91.18、82.81、75.30万元,增加比例分别为14.03%、1.48%、-7.68%、-14.75%、-20.34%、-24.94%。盟员的固定收入、最优激励系数与最优努力水平均随可替代程度增大而增大,当可替代程度为0.2时,盟主获得的收入最大,方案最优。

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