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应对并购风险的可转债与阶段性支付模型与案例研究

, PP. 38-46

Keywords: 可转债,阶段性支付,并购,模型与案例研究

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Abstract:

?本文运用模型研究了可转债和阶段性支付在抑制双边道德风险以及减小不确定性风险中所发挥的作用,并通过SZ能源集团并购案例详细考察了我国国有上市公司在并购过程中所存在的各种风险。结果表明,内嵌转股期权的可转债支付合约可以有效抑制并购中的双边道德风险,在阶段性支付的辅助下,则更能有效地防范市场相关风险。最后,为了更好的说明可转债和阶段性支付对于并购风险的防范作用,我们进一步通过案例分析了可转债和阶段支付的应用情况,发现阶段性支付思想已经体现在并购的现金支付方式中,但是可转债支付在国内并购中的应用尚不多见。

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